responsibility, 8 and public goods, 9 its prime application is in the sphere of responsibility.
TPMH can help to explain and understand the difficulty of determining and implementing responsibility in collective settings. It may allow us to identify the conditions and processes that explain when diffusion of responsibility occurs and to assess its benefits and costs.
While the notion of TPMH mostly has been applied in a domestic context, it is highly relevant in the international sphere. Examples of cases of diffusion of responsibility are the institutions involved likewise will be difficult. 12 If States or IOs fail to live up to the collective "responsibility to protect" human populations from mass atrocities 13 -a responsibility that rests in part on obligations that are binding on a plurality of States or organizations 14 -it likewise may be difficult to determine which of the actors is responsible.
Legality of the Use of Force cases in the ICJ
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In all such situations, contributions are spread over several actors, so that it may become difficult to determine that the conditions of responsibility are satisfied; sometimes that will be impossible, with the result that no responsibility can be determined.
In this Chapter I will first set out the dynamics of cooperation that help to understand the situations in which diffusion occurs (paragraph 2). In paragraph 3, I will zoom in on situations in which diffusion may lead to responsibility gaps. I then will discuss what I will call the politics of diffusion. Diffusion is not an autonomous effect of wider changes in global governance, but may be an intended consequence of strategic choices by actors participating in a concerted action (par 4). Finally, I will discuss the benefits and costs of diffusion and argue that while such gaps in particular cases may be inevitable and may even be preconditions for getting relevant actors to agree on action, they raise fundamental normative and institutional challenges for the organization and implementation of concerted action (par 5). 12 
II. Underlying Dynamics
This paragraph will explain that the trend towards concerted action is of a structural nature (1.1) that is reinforced by acceptance of 'shared responsibilities' (1.2).
II.1. Dynamics
Concerted action is not an incidental phenomenon in international affairs that can be expected to give way to the traditional pattern of individualism. It rather reflects fundamental developments in international society and the international legal order that are bound to persist. Three trends that contextualize the phenomenon of shared responsibility are here identified: interdependence, moralization and heterogeneity. 16 These trends influence each other in an intertwined way.
The first trend that drives concerted action is interdependence, underlying the passage from a 'society' mainly characterized by coexistence to one also characterized by cooperation.
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This trend is easily overstated, and in many situations, in particular relating to territory, boundaries, use of force and (non-)intervention the prime function of international law continues to be secure coexistence between States. 18 Nonetheless, it seems incontrovertible that in many areas, States have become dependent on each other to pursue common goods, and indeed have felt compelled to address them jointly.
The interdependencies are both of an objective and a subjective nature. As to the former, in certain areas, factual effects extend across borders, creating interdependencies when States wish to address such effects. Transboundary environmental effects, depletion of natural resources, trade in endangered species, piracy, refugee flows, human trafficking, arms trade, and transboundary crime are examples.
In other areas it is merely the perception that has changed, rather than a reality. The recognition that it is no longer acceptable that genocide or mass killings within a particular 16 State be committed is an example. 19 The interdependence here does not necessarily arise from a physical cross border dimension, but rather from a shared perception that there is a problem to be solved, combined with the fact that individual actors will not be able to effectively prevent genocide or effectively respond to it when it occurs.
Responding to situations of interdependence by concerted action primarily seeks to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of such action. In the areas indicated above -environmental cooperation, transborder criminal cooperation, and responding to genocide and mass killings -, individual States often will be powerless to make a fundamental difference. However, interdependence may also stem from the perceived need to enhancing legitimacy of policies.
While multilateralism surely does not guarantee legitimacy, 20 when the legality of State action may be contested, acting together may help build an argument that the action is legitimate and perhaps even be legal. A State acting on its own will more easily be open to the criticism of acting for its own interests. 21 This seems to underlie, for instance, the concerted action in relation to ISIL in Iraq and Syria in 2014-2015.
Interdependence in any of the above ways can drive a variety of forms of cooperation -from loose agreement on objectives to action through a common organ of an IO. But in a sizeable number of cases, it has led to cooperation that would fall in the category of concerted action, where States and other actors closely coordinate their policies in pursuit of a common aim.
Examples are the concerted action in relation to ISIL, through 'coalitions of the willing' in Libya, 22 in AU peacekeeping operations, 23 in relation to piracy in the horn of Africa, 24 and in international fisheries policy. 25 The second trend, directly related to the above noted subjective dimension of The combined effect of these three trends is that States, international institutions and increasingly other actors increasingly cooperate in response to perceived common problems, thus proportionately increasing the situations where harmful outcomes may result from such cooperation.
II.2 The multiplier effect of 'shared responsibilities'
The practice of States and other actors to engage in concerted action is further strengthened by recognition of moral, political and legal responsibilities to do so. In relation to many of the areas identified above, States and other actors that engage in concerted action do so in recognition of a 'shared responsibility' that they would have in relation to that particular issue. For instance, in December 2014, the Security Council adopted a resolution prompted by the ties between cross-border crime and terrorism and stressed the importance of strengthening trans-regional and international cooperation on a basis of 'a common and shared responsibility to counter the world drug problem and related criminal activities'. wrongful acts. In the examples given above, saying that two persons share a responsibility in relation to a particular situation then may mean that these persons both have to take care of that situation. It then concerns an ex ante rather than an ex post responsibility. Responsibility in this sense is essentially forward looking, rather than relating to a sharing of harm that already has been caused.
The recognition of shared responsibilities in this ex ante sense is highly relevant for our topic.
They provide a normative underpinning that sustains and propels concerted action. They transform concerted action from ad hoc cooperation, depending on the will and perceived interests of the actors involved, in a cooperation that is expected or required.
We can identify three different strands of these ' ex ante' shared responsibilities: moral, The moral, political and legal dimensions of shared responsibility will often intertwine, and the same shared responsibility that in scholarship may be advanced on moral grounds, may be accepted by actors and be transformed into a political and/or a legal principle. The 'responsibility to protect' is an example of this cooperation-propelling potential of a mixed moral-political-legal concept of shared responsibility.
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III. Responsibility Gaps
Diffusion of responsibility, which means that in situations of concerted action responsibility is spread over this multiplicity of actors, need does not adversely affect the possibility to determine responsibility. Individual actors retain their individual obligation, even when they act in concert. Moreover, the fact that more than one actor is engaged in a particular wrongful act, does not release each individual actor from its responsibilities. This was recognized in the Corfu Channel case, where the Court was apparently faced with a harm caused by two parties, but only one appeared before it as a defendant, and it decided to neglect the other party and put all responsibility and all compensation on Albania. 51 However, in particular situations, diffusion may lead to the undermining of responsibility.
This paragraph will identify three reasons that help explain why this can be the case: the normative problem of determination of obligations and attribution in collective settings (3.1), institutional gaps in situations of concerted action (3.2) and informational gaps (3.3).
III.1 The normative gap
In its original formulation, TMPH was framed as a normative problem. The difficulty of identifying who is responsible for a harmful outcome in a collective setting then may be due to the fact that individual contributions may be too small or otherwise be insufficient to meet criteria for responsibility. The principle of independent responsibility dictates that responsibility is only assigned to actors whose individual contributions to the harm are sufficiently significant to pass the threshold that is required for responsibility.
However, in situations of many hands, tasks may be chopped up, so that multiple actors perform small tasks which combine to larger (harmful) outcomes. 58 Individual actors then may not meet the conditions for responsibility.
Three situations in particular can be identified where a normative gap may arise that leads to diffusion of responsibility. A first situation in which diffusion may lead to a responsibility gap arises when not all actors involved are bound by primary obligations. This is in particular relevant for concerted action involving IOs, which may not in a similar degree as States be bound by treaty or customary obligations. It is precisely this feature that has given rise to the idea of circumvention: the possibility that States circumvent their own obligations by acting through an international organization, as a result of which their own responsibility may be 54 ARSIWA (n 34), art 1-2; ARIO (n 34), art 1-2. 55 The second cause of a normative gap is when secondary obligations are unassigned.
Diffusion of responsibility can undermine the forward looking potential of the law of responsibility by making it unclear who is to respond to a breach. This is in particular relevant for obligations to prevent 62 and obligations of result which may be structured in a
way that makes it difficult to determine who is responsible for what, and may allow States to escape their responsibility by pointing to the non-performance of obligations by others.
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David Miller's observation that, "an undistributed duty . . . to which everybody is subject is likely to be discharged by nobody unless it can be allocated in some way", 64 is relevant for diffused responsibility. In effect, this may lead to a bystander effect. The Court reasoned that the delays could not be attributed to either State, because they resulted, rather, from "a system of mutual assistance under which the requesting State is dependent on the co-operation of the other State".
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It is relevant to recall that under the principle of independent responsibility, the State, or international organization, as the case may be, is responsible for its own conduct and its own wrongs. 67 It is not responsible for the conduct of someone else. The principle of independent responsibility is firmly established in the ARSIWA 68 77 The ECtHR considered that the responsibility of any of the respondent States could not be invoked "on the sole basis that those States allegedly formed part (at varying unspecified levels) of a coalition with the US, when the impugned actions were carried out by the US, when security in the zone in which those actions took place was assigned to the US and when the overall command of the coalition was vested in the US." 78 Another noteworthy example is the decision of the ECtHR in Behrami. The Court attributed all acts and omissions relating to the failed demining operations in Kosovo exclusively to the UNUN, and not to its member States, without considering the possibility of a more nuanced solution in which responsibility would be shared. 79 Also in relation to the role of UNMIK in Kosovo, responsibility was channeled to the UN rather than (also) Kosovo, effectively undermining a role of Kosovo in the eventual rebuilding process. 80 The common element of the above examples is that IL structures its primary and secondary rules in a way that makes it relatively easy for each of multiple parties to contribute to a wrong, yet remain below the threshold where its responsibility would be engaged.
III.2 The institutional gap
A second cause that may contribute to diffusion of responsibility is the institutional setting in which concerted action is embedded. Particular institutional structures may not be attuned to a diffusion of responsibility, and may sustain responsibility gaps by making it difficult to
identify who did what and who was responsible for what.
One problem relates to the set-up of international adjudication. Though questions of responsibility are not typically brought in international courts (but rather are settled in negotiations), there is a not insignificant body of case law on questions of international responsibility involving multiple responsible parties, in particular in the ICJ 81 and the ECtHR. 82 However, the present system of international dispute settlement is not well designed to deal with multilateral disputes. 83 This has relevance for adjudication of questions of harm arising out of concerted action. For instance, given that international dispute settlement mechanisms are based on the consent of States, the mere fact that one responsible State has not consented to the judicial process may suffice to exclude a case of harm arising from concerted action from judicial scrutiny. Likewise, if one of the wrongdoing actors is an IO other than the EU or the Seabed Authority, questions of shared responsibility may be deemed inadmissible before the ICJ, the WTO DSU, the LOSC DSP and the ECtHR, which do not have jurisdiction over (other) international organisations.
Perhaps the most visible barrier to adjudication of claims arising out of concerted action is that a court may not be able to proceed against one actor, if the other actors involved in the concerted action are not part of the litigation. A court may be required to protect the interests of co-responsible parties who are not party to the dispute, by deciding that it has no jurisdiction over the claim against the actor over which it otherwise would have jurisdiction. 
III.3 The information gap
A directly related third cause of diffusion of responsibility is that 'many hands' make it gaps also may exists in relation to joint action on piracy, where rules of engagement usually will be beyond the reach of plaintiffs and cross border joint policy operations.
IV The Politics of Diffusion
Diffusion, and its possible effects on responsibility gaps, is not a phenomenon that is 'outthere', but rather a manifestation of conduct and strategies of relevant actors.
This paragraph will first identify the essential political nature of the law of responsibility (and of particular choices on the assignment of responsibility) (4.1) and then identify particular strategies for diffusing responsibility (4.2).
IV.1 The political nature of responsibility-design
The form and content of any scheme of responsibility does not automatically follow on the power' of relevant actors over others. 95 States exercise power over IL making or over particular international institutions, in a way that serves their interests. Thereby, they can influence the rules of responsibility that determine whether or not a particular type of conduct (including participation in concerted action) does or does not engage the responsibility of a State.
Power, from this perspective, may not only breed responsibility, but may also shield actors from responsibility. The law of responsibility, and the institutions and processes in which it is embedded, in itself is the result of choices and practices of States. The ineptitude of IL for dealing with harmful consequences of concerted action serves States and other actors well, by allowing them to engage in blame-avoidance and blame-shifting, thus shielding themselves from responsibility.
IL is for instance agnostic in regard to the exercise of soft power, by which States can affect others 'through the effective means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes'. 96 The same holds when States exercise 'overall control' over other actors. It was precisely the concern over the range of power not covered by effective control that prompted the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) to opt for the less demanding standard of overall control in Tadic. 97 The fact that the ICJ in the Bosnian Genocide reconfirmed effective control as the appropriate standard, 98 confirms the shielding function of the standard of attribution, working against the proposition that power breeds responsibility. The high thresholds set by the ARSIWA and the ARIO make it perfectly possible that a State exercises (soft) power to influence, in a concerted action, private actors or other States, without this leading to attribution of such acts to the State and thus without leading to (shared) responsibility. 99 The result may be that responsibility is shifted to other actors.
A related point is that the law of responsibility, itself the product of power, feeds back to constitute and legitimize particular exercises of power. International obligations do not only prohibit but also legitimize doing what is not prohibited. 100 This applies equally to rules of responsibility. The prohibition on aid and assistance with regards to the commission of a wrongful act may, for instance, legitimize more than it prohibits. 101 
IV.2 Diffusion strategies
To some extent, concerted action in itself can be considered as a diffusion strategy. From the perspective of the participants in a particular concerted action, adding more 'hands' to the concerted action, can be necessary as drawing in outside actors may increase the chances of success of cooperation (for instance in the case of climate change). However, adding more partners also may increase the possibility of diffusion, and thus may shield participants from responsibility. Partnerships between international institutions and other actors are an example.
Partnerships engaged by the WHO or the World Bank involve a great many different actors.
When no clear arrangements have been made on the assignment of responsibility, it becomes difficult to determine who is responsible for what. 102 International practice shows a variety of other strategies by which States can diffuse (or shift) responsibility to other actors. In relation to IOs, the concept of 'circumvention', represents a strategy by which IOs can work through States, 103 or, conversely, by which States can act, in a concerted action, through IOs.
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Yet another alternative concept is orchestration -a term that has been conceptualized as referring to indirect and soft ways in which international institutions act through intermediaries. 105 Orchestration need not be (and commonly will not be) a strategy expressly aimed to achieve diffusion, but this may well be the result. In particular cases, the result may well be intended.
Delegation presents another strategy. By delegation States and international institutions can act with and through others, with potential limiting effects on the scope of their own responsibility. 106 A variant is the phenomenon of 'outsourcing' of tasks, possibility with accompanying responsibility, to other actors, such as private security corporations. 107 The strategies identified above need not be designed to evade responsibility or shift it to other actors. However, in some cases it may be the intention of actors that seek to diffuse responsibility to ensure that they themselves are protected from claims. Diffusion strategies then may take the form of blame games, a term referring to situations 'where multiple players are trying to pin the responsibility on one another for some adverse event, acting as blamers to avoid being blamees'. An alternative strategy is individualizing blame. 111 Rather than collectivizing blame (and extending it all), blame is then shifted to one or a few actors, in effect shielding the blamers.
As noted by Hood, this strategy 'is about shifting rather than reducing or preventing blame.' 112 In the Srebrenica cases, which sought to hold the Netherlands and the UN responsible in relation to the eviction of persons from the UN compound in Srebrenica, both defendants denied responsibility; they thus effectively placed the blame on each other, and they both attempted to shift blame onto the Bosnian Serbs and the FRY.
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In international affairs blame shifting is not a regularly practice, at least not between allies.
Blame avoidance may be politically more attractive. 114 This may be different, however when there are alternative actors to whom blame can be shifted without the accompanying risk that this practice may at one point backfire.
V. Benefits and Costs of Diffusion
Having set out the factors that contribute to diffusion of responsibility, the question now can
be addressed how we normatively should assess this phenomenon. Is diffusion of responsibility a problem we should care about, and that would call for a reconsideration of the role and contents of responsivity in situations of concerted action? Or is it a regular part of responsibility processes that simply reflects the nature and loci of international governance?
In other words: is 'the problem of many hands' really a problem?
Diffusion in itself is a neutral term that frames and describes the spread of ideas, institutions or, as in the case of responsibility, legal principles and processes. Even the fact that responsibility gaps may occur in principle does not strip diffusion of its neutral nature.
Whether diffusion with its resulting gaps is a good development depends on several questions:
is responsibility in itself a positive value; does it fit in the variety of other contexts to which it is diffused; 115 if not, are there proper alternatives, and so on. Saying that 'responsibility' is diffused in itself is just a way of framing and describing processes of governance that may or may not be evaluated in positive terms.
I will separately identify a number of benefits (5.1) and costs (5.2) of diffusion and related responsibility gaps. Articulating the benefits and costs also helps us understand better the strategic choices of relevant actors to engage in politics of diffusion, as discussed in the previous section.
V.1 Benefits
Responsibility fulfills important, positive functions -both in domestic societies and in IL. If responsibility indeed is a positive value, it follows that diffusion of responsibility in principle is a positive development. It allows responsibility to be better attuned to processes of governance which have become diffused or, as coined by Nico Krisch, become 'liquid'.
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The fact that responsibility also become diffuse may match better the places where decisions are actually made.
Perhaps somewhat counterintuitively, also when diffusion leads to responsibility gaps, this may serve positive functions. This is in particular due to the fact that responsibility can have a chilling effect. If so, a designed problem of many hands, that leads to such absence of responsibility, may well have benefits. The willingness of States to accept obligations, may be dependent on their ability to prevent responsibility. One option for doing so is diffusion. If they are unable to do so, they may be unwilling to engage in cooperation in the first place.
Cole notes with reference to climate change that using liability to promote mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions could prove counterproductive; rather that inducing cooperation, it might reduce incentives for States to participate in international regimes, i.e., to share responsibility.
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In terms of costs-benefit assessment, diffusion of responsibility then may be beneficial:
action without, or with 'diluted' responsibility may produce better outcomes then no action at all.
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Whether States indeed would make their willingness to engage in cooperation conditional on their ability to escape responsibility is easier raised then answered. modes of governance and substantive obligations that reduce the change of being held responsible), and it is plausible that the higher the risk of responsibility in case of nonperformance, the more cautious they will be in accepting obligations. If so, we should be cautious in adopting a one-dimensional critique on diffusion, and not uncritically resort to antidotes (such as joint and several responsibility) that may improve responsibility in situations of concerted action, yet undermine such action in the first place.
V.2 Costs
Benefits of diffusion of responsibility and in particular of responsibility may be partially or wholly outweighed by costs of diffusion. Two such costs are particularly relevant: identified:
costs in terms of the performance of obligations and in terms of injured parties.
Impact on performance of obligations
A first angle for assessing the impact of diffusion is that responsibility is a central element of Whether diffusion indeed will undermine the incentives of actors to perform their obligations presumes, as a first step, that that obligations matter at all for the conduct of relevant actors 120 and, as an extension, that the perspective of being held responsible is a relevant factor in changing the conduct of States and international institutions. Thus, while responsibility presumes the existence of obligations, it also is more than that, and its incentives-effects may go beyond those of obligations.
Three more specific reasons can be identified that would support such an impact. One is that responsibility may strengthen the internalization of obligations -one of the main factors that supports compliance with international obligations. 121 A second factor is that responsibility may impact on the reputational impact of IL. 122 State may care about the reputational effects of non-compliance, but may do so even more when such non-compliance may trigger their international responsibility. A third factor is that reparation, notably obligations of restitution and compensation provide incentives for compliance. 123 The two last mechanisms may be supported by scholarship that is premised on theories of rationality which somehow seems to presume that States, make calculating decisions in their own self-interest. 124 This impact of diffusion on incentives may have wider ramification in the form of collective action problems. If actors do not individually feel the consequences in terms of being held responsible, they may be tempted to look for others to do the job. This will be particularly relevant when the participation of multiple States is necessary for addressing a perceived problem and for producing a common goods, for instance in situations involving transborder effects in areas such as global health, financial markets, the environment, or organized crime, where any single State is quite powerless to provide answers. Because obligations and responsibilities are not specifically assigned, and responsibility is not likely to be forthcoming, actors may be inclined to wait for each other, with the result that nothing happens. One can recall Olson´s argument, developed the theory in the economic context of public goods, that as members of a large group generally hold the assumption that someone else in the group can and will provide the public good, the incentives for these members to provide for it themselves are weakened. 125 This will in particular affect 'aggregate-effort' goods, which require action by all actors involved. 126 In these areas, 'the outcome that each agent desires cannot be achieved unless everyone performs his or her contributory action.
Here the action of each agent is directly causally necessary for realization of the desired outcome, so the outcome is of necessity aimed at qua collective end.' 127 Diffusion then may undermine the actual realization of the common aims.
Private costs
Diffusion can undermine a key function of attributing responsibility: to ensure justice to victims. 128 This holds both for injured States and injured individuals. If harm is caused, yet the conditions for individual responsibility are not satisfied or responsibility cannot be determined for other reasons, and it also is not possible to bring an effective claim against the collectivity as such, injured parties will be without redress. 129 In effect, the loss will then be left were it falls -with the victim, rather than being transferred back to one or more responsible actors. 130 One reason why the position of victims tend to be weaker in situations of concerted action is that it may be more difficult for private parties to determine which actors play which role in a particular concerted action. This in in particular the case where information is spread over many actors and moreover of an informal nature -for instance in the case of partnerships between international institutions and private parties. 131 The effect on injured parties has both a procedural and a substantive dimension. As to the former, diffusion of responsibility over multiple parties will limit access of injured parties to courts in relation of all or the main actors involved in a concerted action. There often is a mismatch between the concerted nature of action, on the one hand, and the available remedies against the actors involved in that action, on the other. The principles of individual responsibility are accompanied by processes for implementation and enforcement that match the characteristics of individual rather than shared responsibility. 132 However, in the increasingly complex character of international relations, 'legal disputes between States are rarely purely bilateral'. 133 The present system of international dispute settlement is hardly designed to deal with multilateral disputes. 134 Procedures may not be able to capture all parties involved and may not do justice to the complexity of a context consisting of multiple responsible actors. For instance, given that international dispute settlement mechanisms are based on the consent of States, the mere fact that one State involved has not consented to the judicial process may suffice to exclude any case of shared responsibility from judicial scrutiny. Likewise, if one of the wrongdoing actors happens to be an IO, questions of shared responsibility will be deemed inadmissible before most international judicial bodies given that acts of IOs are not judiciable before them.
Diffusion of responsibility also may affect substantive entitlements. If contributions are spread over multiple actors, relative contributions of individual actors will be relatively small.
In the absence of a principle of joint and several responsibility, individual actors may not be able, or may not be required, to provide a full remedy. When reparation consist of restitution or specific performance, individual responsible actors may not be able to provide the remedy that is required.
VI. Conclusion
This Chapter has demonstrated that diffusion of responsibility may result in responsibility gaps and that such gaps in part are explained by the dominant paradigm of individual responsibility. This process of diffusion should be understood as a political process, that is sustained and driven by IL, which in itself is a reflection of that political process. Diffusion may bring both benefits and costs, in terms of the accountability of the exercise of public authority, in terms of performance of international obligations, and in particular in terms of the protection of the rights of injured parties. How these benefits and costs will be evaluated depends on a contextual analysis and cannot be answered in the abstract. What can be concluded at a general level, though, is that while diffusion as such may help connect responsibility to a diversity of actors, it also may lead to responsibility gaps that undermine the value and role of responsibility in the international legal order.
